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Do cyber capabilities create novel risks of a future political 
crisis between the United States and China escalating into a 
conflict? This article outlines one potential pathway for interstate 
crises to escalate: the use of force in response to adversary 
hacking operations that could enable high-end cyber attacks. 
Often known as operational preparation of the environment or 
OPE, these acts lay the groundwork for future attacks but are 
difficult to distinguish from espionage. While some scholars 
argue that states might respond to the discovery of an intruder 
with the use of force, others have found little empirical evidence 
that cyber capabilities affect interstate conflict dynamics. To 
assess these competing claims, we examine Chinese and U.S. 
leadership views, organizational and operational practices for 
cyber conflict, and the bilateral cyber relationship. We conclude 
that the risk of inadvertent escalation due to cyber capabilities 
in a future Sino-American crisis cannot be dismissed. 
1   Kurt M. Campbell and Ali Wyne, “The Growing Risk of Inadvertent Escalation Between Washington and Beijing,” Lawfare, Aug. 16, 2020, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/growing-risk-inadvertent-escalation-between-washington-and-beijing.
In the context of rapidly deteriorat-ing Sino-American relations, U.S. ana-lysts are increasingly concerned that a political crisis between the two coun-
tries could escalate into an armed conflict. 
Since both countries began to develop cyber ca-
pabilities in the mid-2000s, scholars and analysts 
have warned that those capabilities could add in-
centives for either the United States or China to 
use force in a crisis. As Kurt Campbell and Ali 
Wyne wrote: “Continued advances in cyberoffen-
sive capabilities that increase the risk of inadvert-
ent escalation, potentially up to the nuclear level, 
make … the deteriorating security environment 
in the Asia-Pacific even more concerning.”1 De-
spite these concerns, scholars continue to debate 
whether offensive cyber capabilities create novel 
risks of great-power political crises escalating into 
conflicts.  Cyber capabilities differ from conven-
tional military capabilities and nuclear weapons 
in important ways. These differences create new 
pathways through which a great-power crisis could 
escalate into a conventional conflict. But scholars 
have yet to find empirical evidence that states or 
individuals actually take those pathways.
This article examines one of these novel esca-
lation pathways in the context of the Sino-Amer-
ican relationship: the difficulty of distinguishing 
between hacking for espionage and operational 
preparation of the environment (OPE), an essential 
precursor to most high-end cyber attacks. A state 
discovering that an adversary has exploited its 
computer networks will often struggle to discern 
why that adversary has done so. On the one hand, 
the intruders might be performing espionage, in-
cluding the collection of intelligence to better de-
fend their own networks. On the other hand, the 
intruders may be performing OPE to enable a cyber 
attack. Intrusions for either purpose are often in-
distinguishable to the network’s operator. 
As most cyber attacks need OPE to be success-
ful, this OPE-espionage distinction problem cre-
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ates pathways for inadvertent escalation in a crisis. 
A state could correctly detect an adversary’s OPE 
and, fearing an imminent cyber attack with severe 
consequences, choose to use force first, escalating 
the conflict with a cyber or even kinetic attack. But 
a state could also misperceive an adversary’s efforts 
to collect intelligence via cyber means as prepara-
tion to conduct a cyber attack and preempt that at-
tack with conventional or cyber attacks of its own.2 
Analysts are particularly concerned about a scenar-
io in which a state discovers during a crisis that its 
adversary has intruded into its nuclear command, 
control, and communications networks.3 Despite 
these concerns, academic studies based on obser-
vational data, surveys, and simulations find little 
correlation between cyber attacks and escalation, 
either in peacetime or during conflicts.4 Scholars 
have reasoned that most cyber attacks are simply 
not destructive enough to worsen crisis or conflict 
outcomes.5 These limited effects, coupled with the 
bloodless, secret nature of cyber attacks, might in-
stead open up new pathways for de-escalation.6 
In an attempt to evaluate the concerns of the 
U.S. policy community and the ongoing scholarly 
2   See for example, Martin Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012); Herbert Lin, “Escalation 
Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 6, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 46–70, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26267261.
3   See for example, James M. Acton, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation,” Daedalus 149, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 133–149, https://doi.
org/10.1162/daed_a_01794; Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence,” in 
Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations, ed. Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2019), 195–234.
4   Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), chap. 5; Nadiya Kostyuk and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 2 (November 2017): 317–347, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002717737138; Jacquelyn G. Schneider, “The Information 
Revolution and International Stability: A Multi-Article Exploration of Computing, Cyber, and Incentives for Conflict” (Ph.D. diss, George Washing-
ton University, 2017), 119; Sarah Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving 
beyond Effects-Based Logics,” Journal of Cybersecurity 5, no. 1 (2019): 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyz007.
5   Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 41–73, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00136; Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,” Security Studies 26, no. 
3 (2017): 476–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396; Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools 
of Escalation,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2019): 122–45, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760131; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen, and 
Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
6   Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy; Joshua Rovner, “Cyber War as an Intelligence Contest,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 16, 2019, 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/cyber-war-as-an-intelligence-contest/.
7   For a useful discussion of the external validity of surveys and simulations, see, Kreps and Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Con-
ventional, and Nuclear Domains,” 9; Schneider, “The Information Revolution and International Stability,” 122–30.
8   Those reasons include differing perceptions of the status quo, differing U.S. and Chinese beliefs about escalation, inattention to inadvertent 
escalation risks, inattention to escalation risks due to relatively moderate levels of tension in the relationship compared to the Cold War, tensions 
between crisis management and warfighting objectives, and the employment of military capabilities with multiple roles. See, James M. Acton, 
“Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” 
International Security 43, no. 1 (Summer 2018): 89–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320; Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear 
Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 482–484, https://doi.org
/10.1080/01402390.2012.714710; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Strategy and U.S.-China 
Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor 
Fravel, “Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views of Nuclear Escalation,” International Security 44, no. 2 (2019): 61–109, https://doi.org/10.1162/
isec_a_00359; Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 
(Spring 2013): 79–62, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00114; Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory 
and Practice in China,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 28–71, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1118&context=nwc-review; Joshua Rovner, “Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 40, no. 5 (2017): 696–730, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1293532; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the 
Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 50–92, https://doi.
org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274; Zhao Tong and Li Bin, “The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective,” in Entanglement: Russian 
and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, ed. James M. Acton (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2017), 59–63; Adam Segal, “U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in a China-U.S. Military Confrontation,” in Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strate-
gic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations, ed. Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 319–41. 
debates on cyber escalation in great-power crises, 
this article examines the escalation risks created by 
cyber capabilities, and OPE in particular, in a future 
crisis scenario involving the United States and Chi-
na. The external validity of existing empirical find-
ings to military crises among great powers is limited 
because no such crisis has occurred in the past two 
decades and these situations are difficult to replicate 
in surveys and simulations with U.S. participants.7 A 
Sino-American crisis scenario is a most likely case 
for theoretical claims that cyber capabilities cre-
ate novel escalation risks. Both countries would be 
more likely to react to any independent effect of cy-
ber technology on their incentives to use force, if 
such incentives exist, than they might in non-crisis 
situations where political and strategic factors could 
extinguish those incentives. 
A Sino-American crisis scenario involving Taiwan, 
North Korea, or territorial disputes in the East Chi-
na Sea and South China Sea could plausibly spill 
over into armed conflict. Scholars have pointed to 
a number of reasons that a Sino-American conflict 
could escalate that are not specific to cyber opera-
tions.8 They have also argued that cyber capabilities 
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could contribute to Sino-American crisis instability, 
due to the difficulty of distinguishing OPE for cyber 
attacks from espionage, pressures on decision-mak-
ers to use force before military networks are degrad-
ed, operators accidentally damaging each other’s 
networks, or mistaken attribution of cyber attacks 
conducted by third parties.9 But existing analysis of 
the contribution of OPE to Sino-American crisis es-
calation is relatively superficial.10
To thoroughly assess the escalation risks posed 
by the problem of distinguishing OPE and cy-
ber-enabled espionage in a Sino-American crisis, 
this paper follows the approach of existing scholar-
ship that attempts to assess the risk of escalation 
in future Sino-American crisis and conflict scenar-
ios. Given the scarcity and imperfection of avail-
able sources, especially on the Chinese side, our 
findings are necessarily tentative but do provide a 
more comprehensive assessment of the escalation 
risks than existing scholarship. No military crisis 
has occurred since both states developed offensive 
cyber capabilities in the mid-2000s.11 We therefore 
examine the two countries’ leadership statements, 
threat perceptions, procedures for authorizing 
cyber operations, organizational structures, capa-
bilities, and policies for evidence that they create, 
recognize, and seek to manage escalatory risks. We 
also consider features of the bilateral relationship 
that could exacerbate or mitigate the risks of cyber 
capabilities contributing to crisis instability, such 
as mechanisms for crisis communication. 
Our analysis provides evidence that inadvert-
ent escalation risks associated with OPE would be 
present in a future Sino-American crisis scenario. 
But leaders from both countries might choose to 
avoid those pathways. Official U.S. policy for of-
fensive cyber operations recognizes the escalation 
risks associated with cyber espionage being mis-
taken for OPE, but the United States has recent-
ly made changes to its cyber strategy that may 
increase these risks. Meanwhile, Chinese writings 
recognize the difficulty of distinguishing between 
cyber attacks and OPE but do not discuss the es-
9   David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability,” Survival 56, no. 4 (September 2014): 7–22, https://
doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.941543; Ariel (Eli) Levite and Lyu Jinghua, “Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace: Toward Collaboration or 
Confrontation?” China Military Science, Jan. 24, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/24/chinese-american-relations-in-cyberspace-to-
ward-collaboration-or-confrontation-pub-78213; Segal, “U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in a China-U.S. Military Confrontation.”
10   Gompert and Libicki, “Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability,” 13; Acton, “Escalation Through Entanglement”; Zhao and Li, “The 
Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement,” 320.
11   The last serious bilateral crisis occurred in 2001 when a Chinese fighter aircraft collided with a U.S. EP-3 spy plane conducting surveillance 
over the South China Sea.
12   For key contributions to that debate, see, Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace; Kreps and Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cy-
ber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains”; Valeriano and Maness, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities; Jon R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber 
Warfare,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 365–404, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122; Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar”; Borghard 
and Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace”; Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” International Security 41, no. 
3 (Winter 2016): 44–71, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00266; Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Coercion Through Cyberspace: The Stability-In-
stability Paradox Revisited,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 179–203.
calation risks resulting from that difficulty. We 
also find that three aspects of the Sino-American 
cyber relationship add to the likelihood of the two 
countries misperceiving each other’s behavior: 
an asymmetry in the relative maturity of U.S. and 
Chinese cyber doctrine and cyber capabilities, dim 
prospects for official dialogue that could improve 
mutual understanding of each other’s cyber opera-
tions, and the absence of a crisis communications 
mechanism specific to cyberspace. We acknowl-
edge that our empirical evidence could support the 
claim that cyber technology does not create inad-
vertent escalation risks, but we do not draw this 
conclusion. We found no evidence that China has 
carefully assessed these escalation risks. Nor are 
we confident that the United States has parsed the 
independent effect of cyber technology from oth-
er incentives that U.S. adversaries face not to use 
force in its assessments of those risks. 
These issues are important to both scholars and 
policymakers for a variety of reasons. First, we aim 
to contribute to the debate about the escalation 
risks created by cyber operations by examining a 
scenario in which cyber capabilities are expected 
to contribute to the use of force.12 Second, we pro-
vide evidence of Chinese views with which to as-
sess the escalatory potential of cyber operations. 
Evidence from China is missing from existing poli-
cy debate and scholarly research about cyber con-
flict, which draws heavily on U.S. experiences, per-
spectives, and participants. Third, these questions 
are relevant to policymakers in both countries who 
manage the risks of cyber escalation, especially as 
Sino-American tensions increase.
We begin with a brief explanation of OPE as a 
distinctive feature of cyber attacks. The second 
section outlines the competing hypotheses about 
cyber escalation in existing scholarly literature and 
the mechanisms that could link detection of an in-
trusion in a crisis with the decision to use force. 
The third, fourth, and fifth sections examine the 
evidence for these hypotheses in U.S. documents 
and statements, Chinese writings and organiza-
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tional practices, and the bilateral cyber relation-
ship, respectively. The sixth section evaluates the 
escalation risks and provides policy recommenda-
tions to mitigate them.
Operational Preparation 
of the Environment
Many cyber operations are governed by a simple 
fact: In order to develop a cyber capability with a 
potent or customized effect on a target network, 
substantial reconnaissance and preparation are re-
quired from within that targeted network. In 2010, 
the Department of Defense defined “Cyber Opera-
tions in Preparation of the Environment” as: 
Non-intelligence enabling functions within 
cyberspace conducted to plan and prepare 
for potential follow-up military operations. 
[Cyber-OPE] includes but is not limited to 
identifying data, system/network configura-
tions, or physical structures … for the pur-
pose of determining system vulnerabilities; 
and actions taken to assure future access 
and/or control of the system, network, or 
data during anticipated hostilities.13 
While cyber OPE has some analogues in other 
forms of military operations — especially in the 
world of special operations and covert action — it 
differs from operations that are more familiar to 
policymakers, such as conventional and nuclear 
operations. Some military capabilities for these 
purposes also require substantial preparation, 
but that activity can take place mostly within a 
state’s own territory. The research, development, 
production, and testing of nuclear weapons and 
their delivery systems have multiyear lead times, 
but this is usually done at home.14 Similar dynam-
ics apply to a state’s development of cruise mis-
13   Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, “Memorandum: Subject: Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations,” 
2010, 7, from “The United States and Cyberspace: Military Organization, Policies, and Activities,” Document 10, National Security Archive, Jan. 20, 
2016, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cyber-vault/2016-01-20/united-states-cyberspace-military-organization-policies-activities. 
14   Some states have tested nuclear weapons outside of their homelands, but they generally do so in outlying territories (e.g., French and U.S. 
tests in their Pacific territories) or on the territory of allies (e.g., U.K. nuclear tests in Australia).
15   See for example, Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 63. 
16   For a helpful comparison of the intelligence requirements for nuclear and offensive cyber operations, see, Austin Long, “A Cyber SIOP?” in 
Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations, ed. Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2019), 116–22.
17   Long, “A Cyber SIOP?” 121.
18   For discussion of this principle and examples, see, Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 2. 
19   Borghard and Lonergan, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” 126.
20   Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” 50–51.
siles, bombers, tanks, and other military hardware. 
While peacetime reconnaissance is fundamental to 
many kinds of military operations,15 preparations 
to use cyber capabilities have different reconnais-
sance requirements than most other operations.16 
Cyber operations differ from these other types of 
military capabilities and operations. Much of the 
development and preparation for a cyber operation 
requires access to or occurs within adversary net-
works. Moreover, the accesses and payloads that 
make offensive cyber operations possible are of-
ten specific to a particular network: Cyber opera-
tions lack the fungibility of conventional or nuclear 
weapons and should be tailored to their targets in 
order to be effective.17 
Contrary to the view that destructive cyber attacks 
on an enemy’s networks are easy to carry out once 
those networks are penetrated, the effectiveness 
of an attack is heavily dependent on the attacker’s 
OPE.18 Nor is gaining access to an adversary’s net-
works a simple task. Gaining and maintaining access 
to a target network is generally difficult, resource 
intensive, and specific to the target network.19 The 
effects of an attack, the ability to sustain those ef-
fects over time, and the ability of an attack to limit 
unintended consequences all depend on how well 
the attacker has prepared and understood the tar-
get network and the likely actions of the network’s 
defenders once the attack commences.20
A few examples illustrate the importance of OPE 
to sophisticated offensive cyber operations. Stux-
net, the most famous cyber attack in history, was 
enabled by months if not years of reconnaissance. 
Kaspersky, a major cyber security firm, found evi-
dence that the attack code of Stuxnet was preced-
ed by code that enabled substantial espionage ef-
forts against Iranian targets. The information from 
these espionage efforts was used to inform the de-
velopment of the Stuxnet code, which manipulated 
the Iranian centrifuges in very specific ways. Espi-
onage and preparation carried out within the Irani-
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an network made the Stuxnet attack possible, but 
the preparation that enabled Stuxnet was useful 
almost exclusively for an attack against Iran.21 The 
Stuxnet code could not be used to attack North 
Korean centrifuges, for example. 
The blackouts in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016 pro-
vide further evidence of the reconnaissance re-
quirements for major cyber attacks on critical ci-
vilian infrastructure. These are vitally important 
cases to study, as they offer the only two public 
instances in which a cyber attack managed to 
turn off the power to hundreds of thousands of 
people. OPE made both attacks possible. A de-
tailed after-action review of the 2015 attack on 
Ukraine concluded:
The strongest capability of the attackers was 
not in their choice of tools or in their exper-
tise, but in their capability to perform long-
term reconnaissance operations required to 
learn the environment and execute a highly 
synchronized, multistage, multisite attack.22 
21   See, “A Fanny Equation: ‘I Am Your Father, Stuxnet,’” Kaspersky Lab, Feb. 17, 2015, https://securelist.com/a-fanny-equation-i-am-your-father-
stuxnet/68787/. For more on Stuxnet, see, Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (New York, NY: Crown, 2014); Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of 
Cyber Warfare.”
22   Robert Lee, Michael Assante, and Tim Conway, “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid,” Electricity Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, 2. 
23   “CRASHOVERRIDE: Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations,” Dragos, https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/Crash-
Override-01.pdf; Michael J. Assante, Robert M. Lee, and Tim Conway, “ICS Defense Use Case No. 6: Modular ICS Malware,” Electricity Informa-
tion Sharing and Analysis Center, Aug. 2, 2017, https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_6.pdf; Anton Cherepanov, “Industroyer: 
Biggest Threat to Industrial Control Systems since Stuxnet,” ESET, June 12, 2017, https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/12/industroyer-big-
gest-threat-industrial-control-systems-since-stuxnet/; Greg Masters, “Industroyer Can Knock out Power Grid, ESET,” SC Magazine, June 12, 2017, 
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/malware/industroyer-can-knock-out-power-grid-eset/.
24   Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, “Cyber-Weapons,” RUSI Journal 157, no. 1 (2012): 6–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.664354; Lin, 
“Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” 50–51. 
25   Ben Elgin and Michael Riley, “Now at the Sands Casino: An Iranian Hacker in Every Server,” Bloomberg, Dec. 11, 2014, https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2014-12-11/iranian-hackers-hit-sheldon-adelsons-sands-casino-in-las-vegas; Chris Kubecka, “How to Implement IT Security after 
a Cyber Meltdown,” YouTube, Dec. 29, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WyMobr_TDSI.
26   “United States of America v. Park Jin Hyok,” Department of Justice, June 8, 2018, 45–53, from “Cyber Brief: DOJ’s Park Jin Hyok 
Criminal Complaint and North Korean Cyber Operations,” National Security Archive, Sept. 6, 2018, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/cy-
ber-vault/2018-09-06/cyber-brief-dojs-park-jin-hyok-criminal-complaint-north-korean-cyber-operations.
27   Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, Aug. 22, 2018, https://www.wired.
com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.
28   “United States of America v. Ahmad Fathi, Hamid Firoozi, Amin Shokohi, Sadegh Ahmadzadegan, Omid Ghaffarinia, Sina Keissar, and Nader 
Saedi,” Department of Justice, March 24, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/834996/download. 
The 2016 attack was even more notable, as it fea-
tured customized malicious code that, due to the 
attackers’ understanding of the industrial control 
systems in Ukraine, enabled more scalable and au-
tomated attacks on power systems.23
Overall, the general pattern is clear: Performing 
OPE is essential to enabling more powerful cyber op-
erations that offer more lasting geopolitical value.24 A 
drumbeat of other attacks bears out this trend. Ira-
nian hackers spent months inside the computer net-
works of Sands Casino and Saudi 
Aramco before they attacked in 
2012.25 North Korean hackers did 
the same with their attacks on 
the computer networks of Sony 
Pictures.26 Russian hackers pre-
pared in a similar way for their 
NotPetya operation, perhaps the 
most devastating cyber attack in 
history, with reports of over $10 
billion in damage.27 Some attacks, 
most notably denial-of-service 
efforts, do not fit into this trend. 
But they are remarkable for their overall lack of po-
tency. For example, the Iranian attacks on the U.S. 
banking sector in 2012 did not require OPE but also 
did not pack much punch.28 
In addition to occurring within an adversary’s 
networks, OPE is difficult to distinguish from espi-
onage once it is discovered by a target. In theory, 
there might be ways for a target to tell whether an 
intrusion is espionage or whether it facilitates an 
attack. But there are no foolproof solutions to this 
OPE-espionage distinction problem. For example, 
an uptick in communication between the attacker 
and malicious code implanted in the target sys-
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tem could signal its purpose, but an attack could 
occur without any of those signals. Those signals 
could also accompany routine intelligence collec-
tion.29 Even if an attacker tries to use those signals 
to distinguish OPE from espionage, the target may 
not receive those signals or treat them as credi-
ble.30 The nature of the target network may provide 
some hints — for example, critical infrastructure 
industrial control systems are more likely to be ex-
ploited for OPE than intelligence gathering — but 
this is not always the case.31 
A final noteworthy feature of OPE is that ex-
ploitation of an adversary’s networks for intelli-
gence gathering could be repurposed for OPE with-
out any telltale signs that the target might detect. 
An operation that begins with the goal of collecting 
general intelligence could quickly and silently shift 
to collecting intelligence that would be useful for 
carrying out a specific attack. In addition, an oper-
ation that begins solely as an espionage operation 
could use the same access to wipe key files on the 
targeted network. For example, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the first blackout in Ukraine 
began with an espionage objective and only later 
morphed into an attack operation.32 
29   Martin C. Libicki, “Drawing Inferences from Cyber Espionage,” CyCon X: Maximizing Effects, 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2018, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-06-Drawing-Inferences-from-Cy-
ber-Espionage.pdf, 4–6.
30   Libicki, “Drawing Inferences from Cyber Espionage,” 4–6.
31   Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, chaps. 3 and 8. 
32   Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/
inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.
33   Goldstein, “First Things First,” 51.
34   Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger Cliff, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st 
Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), xi.
35   For a definition of a “use of force” in cyberspace, see, Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable Cyber 
Operations, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 333–7.
The Novel Escalation Risks of OPE
How and why could an intrusion discovered in 
the midst of a crisis between two great powers cre-
ate incentives for the use of force? How and why 
might decision-makers choose to use force when 
faced with those incentives? 
We define a crisis as “a confrontation between 
two states involving a serious threat to vital na-
tional interests for both sides in which there is the 
expectation of a short time for resolution, and in 
which there is understood to be a sharply increased 
risk of war.”33 We define escalation as “an increase 
in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses 
threshold(s) considered significant by one or more 
of the participants.”34 In the context of a great-pow-
er crisis, escalation involves the use of force, with 
either cyber or kinetic attacks.35 We use the term 
“cyber escalation risks” to refer to an increase in 
the likelihood of a use of force in a great-power cri-
sis due to the nature of cyber technology. 
The existing literature on cyber conflict suggests 
four possible pathways between the discovery of 
an intrusion and the use of force. If decision-mak-
ers discover an intrusion into their key military 
or civilian networks during a crisis, most scholars 
agree that those decision-makers could not rule out 
the possibility that the intrusion enables OPE. But 
scholars disagree on whether decision-makers face 
incentives to escalate the crisis in response to that 
discovery. Whether the discovery of an intrusion 
would lead to the use of force depends on how de-
cision-makers assess the seriousness of the threat 
posed by the intrusion and whether the state also 
has strategic or political incentives to use force. 
These four possibilities are captured in two “esca-
lation hypotheses” that expect the use of force and 
two “de-escalation hypotheses” that do not expect 
the use of force.
First, inadvertent escalation could occur if the 
state assesses that the intrusion poses a serious 
threat and uses force in response to preempt, 
warn, punish, or deny the adversary the benefit 
of using its intrusion to conduct an attack. Sec-
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ond, deliberate escalation could occur if the state 
decides to use force in response to the intrusion 
because of the combination of the threat posed by 
the intrusion and additional political and strategic 
incentives to escalate. The state would ignore the 
threat posed by the intrusion if not for those other 
incentives. Third, the state might assess that even 
if the intrusion is OPE and enables the adversary to 
carry out a cyber attack, the threat posed by that 
attack is bluster rather than a serious threat. In 
this situation, decision-makers would choose not 
to use force. Fourth, the state could assess that the 
intrusion would enable the adversary to carry out 
a cyber attack that does pose a serious threat but 
decide not to use force because of countervailing 
strategic and political incentives. 
Below we outline the mechanisms of intrusion 
detection and assessment of intent shared by all 
four pathways. We then describe the logic under-
pinning the inadvertent escalation hypothesis in 
detail because it makes the strongest claims about 
the independent contribution of cyber technolo-
gy to the use of force. It also best represents the 
concerns in current U.S. policy debates about the 
destabilizing effect of cyber technology in a future 
Sino-American crisis. Lastly, we briefly describe 
the arguments of the other three hypotheses, high-
lighting how their causal claims differ from the in-
advertent escalation hypothesis.
Intrusion Detection in a Crisis
The scenario in which OPE could trigger the use 
of force in a crisis would likely begin months if not 
years before the crisis. The state that desires the 
option to carry out offensive cyber operations in 
a future conflict against important adversary mil-
itary or civilian networks, such as a regional joint 
military command network, would conduct OPE 
during peacetime. Beginning OPE once a crisis has 
begun is almost certainly too late to complete the 
complex, time-consuming task.36 The defenders of 
the target network may even be aware of the at-
tacker’s presence in the network in peacetime and 
try unsuccessfully to expel it. 
Once a political crisis began — over an accidental 
collision between two rivals’ military aircraft, for 
example — decision-makers in both states would 
36   The time required to prepare a network for offensive cyber operations may vary according to the vulnerability of the target. See, Long, “A 
Cyber SIOP?” 120–1; Borghard and Lonergan, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” 125–131.
37   Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace.”
38   Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, chaps. 3 and 8. 
39   Libicki, “Drawing Inferences from Cyber Espionage,” 4–6.
have to decide whether to back down, bargain dip-
lomatically, or initiate a conflict to bargain with 
force. During their deliberations, the target state’s 
decision-makers might discover their adversary’s 
intrusions into important computer networks, in-
cluding those that might be OPE. Such discoveries 
are more likely in a crisis because states anticipate 
espionage and attacks in that context, and will step 
up network defenses accordingly.37 Those leaders 
would then assess the threat posed by each intru-
sion and decide whether and how to respond to it.
Challenges for Assessing Intent
Three features of offensive cyber operations 
complicate the task of the target’s decision-mak-
ers charged with assessing the intent behind the 
intrusion: the OPE-espionage distinction problem, 
incentives for the intruder not to send signals of in-
tent, and the inability of the intruder to send credi-
ble signals of intent. Faced with these uncertainties 
in the midst of a crisis, the target’s decision-makers 
might decide it is most prudent to treat the intru-
sion as OPE, which creates an incentive to use of 
force if they believe that the intrusion poses a se-
rious threat. 
Decision-makers are likely unable to quickly and 
easily determine the intent behind an intrusion. 
Other possible motivations for the intrusion in-
clude monitoring the target’s military operations 
or gathering intelligence about its offensive cyber 
operations.38 The specifics of the intrusion may 
provide some hints of intent but are unlikely to be 
definitive. For example, the target could use foren-
sics to determine whether the intrusion took place 
during or just before the crisis, which could signal 
that an intruder intends to use it to influence the 
crisis. The ease with which the intrusion is discov-
ered could also signal that the intruder intended 
to use it immediately and chose not to take the 
time to develop a stealthier presence. Testing of 
small-scale attacks or an uptick in communication 
between the intruder and code it has implanted in 
the target system could also signal that it is OPE.39 
The intruder would also have difficulty reas-
suring the target state of its intent because the 
Schelling-esque communication of commitment, 
priorities, and limits is fiendishly difficult for perpe-
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trators of cyber operations.40 To preserve its opera-
tional security, the intruder would have incentives 
not to acknowledge which adversary networks it 
has exploited and for what purpose, lest the target 
use that information to remove the intruder.41 Even 
if the intruder sought to reassure the target of its 
intent not to use the intrusion to enable an attack, 
it probably could not do so. A hack begun with one 
intent is able to shift purposes to serve another, 
undermining the credibility of such assurances. 
The Inadvertent Escalation Pathway
The specific claim that cyber operations create 
incentives to use force in a crisis is an example 
of a more general claim that military operations 
and technology can cause misperceptions among 
adversaries with serious consequences for inter-
national conflict.42 One potential consequence of 
those misperceptions is inadvertent escalation, 
which occurs “when a combatant deliberately 
takes actions that it does not perceive to be escala-
tory but are interpreted that way by the enemy.”43 
The canonical scenario of inadvertent escalation is 
a conventional war among nuclear powers in which 
one party conducts “large-scale conventional oper-
ations that produce patterns of damage or threat 
to the major elements of a state’s nuclear force.”44 
The target state interprets the attack as a delib-
40   Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 47–48. For consideration of this point in cyber 
operations, see, Ben Buchanan, The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2020); Jacquelyn G. Schneider, “Deterrence In and Through Cyberspace,” in Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity, ed. 
Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 116–8; Valeriano, Jensen and Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving 
Character of Power and Coercion. 
41   For discussion of this principle and how information aids defense, see, Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, chap. 3. See also, Erik Gartzke 
and Jon R. Lindsay, “Politics by Many Other Means: The Comparative Strategic Advantages of Operational Domains,” Journal of Strategic Studies 
(Published online, June 2020), 23–4, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1768372. For a skeptical view that offensive cyber capabilities would 
be lost if signaled to an adversary, see, Herb Lin, “U.S. Cyber Infiltration of the Russian Electric Grid: Implications for Deterrence,” Lawfare, June 18, 
2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-cyber-infiltration-russian-electric-grid-implications-deterrence.
42   Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 199–214, https://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/2009958; Caitlin Talmadge, “Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold War, Implications for Today,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 42, no. 6 (2019): 864–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811.
43   Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds, xiii.
44   Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 3.
45   Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 3–4. Inadvertent escalation could also occur in a purely conventional conflict. See, Talmadge, “Emerging Tech-
nology and Intra-War Escalation Risks,” 368.
46   Organizational factors and the fog of war provide alternative mechanisms linking the attacker’s actions to the target’s increased nuclear alert 
status or use. See, Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 14–29.
47   States are likely to misperceive each other’s capabilities and actions as threatening, as the security dilemma claims, if it is either easier for 
states to conduct offensive operations than defensive operations (i.e., the offense-defense balance favors the offense), or impossible to distinguish 
between offensive and defensive capabilities or operations (i.e., offense and defense are indistinguishable). Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security 
Dilemma,” 186–7. The offense-defense balance does not need to favor the offense for inadvertent escalation to occur, although it can intensify the 
victim state’s incentives to use force.
48   Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 1–3.
49   This calculation is distinct from, but could be enhanced by, a first-mover advantage. Offense-defense theorists disagree on whether 
first-mover advantages should be included in the offense-defense balance. See, Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 189; Charles L. 
Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?” International Security 22, no. 4 (April 1, 1998): 
71–2, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.4.44. Slayton defines the balance in cyberspace according to the relative cost and utility of attacking or 
defending a particular network, which could encompass a first-mover advantage. Rebecca Slayton, “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? 
Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment,” International Security 41, no. 3 (2017): 72–109, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00267. 
erate attempt to degrade its nuclear force and re-
sponds by using nuclear weapons or accelerating 
preparations for their use, although it could also 
ignore the effect of the attack on its nuclear arse-
nal.45 Inadvertent nuclear escalation occurs as an 
unintended consequence of conventional military 
operations. Similarly, escalation to the use of cy-
ber or kinetic force could occur in a crisis as an 
unintended consequence of the normal conduct of 
cyber espionage. 
Scholars argue that misperceptions commonly 
associated with the security dilemma are one rea-
son that inadvertent escalation could occur.46 Spe-
cifically, the difficulty of distinguishing between an 
adversary’s offensive and defensive military opera-
tions is sufficient to produce misperceptions about 
the intent of the attacking state within the target 
state.47 The attacking state’s conventional military 
operations could therefore make its adversary less 
secure in unintended ways,48 which creates an 
incentive for the target state to use force sooner 
rather than later.49 
Similarly, the OPE-espionage distinction problem 
could trigger the use of force if the target state’s 
leaders make worst-case-scenario assessments of 
the attacker’s intent and capability to damage an 
important, compromised information network. The 
target state need only calculate that its ability to 
achieve its conflict objectives will diminish in the fu-
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ture if it ignores the attacker’s actions now.50 There 
are four mechanisms by which a state could make a 
worst-case-scenario assessment of the seriousness 
of the threat posed by an intrusion and decide to 
use force: avoiding a military disadvantage, percep-
tions of an adversary’s hostile intent, emotions, and 
information asymmetries within bureaucracies. The 
use of force, whether a cyber or kinetic attack, could 
serve a variety of purposes: to preempt an adver-
sary’s use of force in the crisis, to use a hacked mil-
itary system before its functions are disrupted, to 
send a signal to the adversary to stop hacking the 
target’s military systems, or to destroy or degrade 
the adversary’s cyber forces that would otherwise 
carry out the attack on the target network. 
Most obviously, a state that detects an adver-
sary’s OPE might use force to preempt a cyber at-
tack that could put the state at a military disad-
vantage in a future conflict. Attacking immediately 
could preserve the state’s confidence in its ability 
to operate its military forces as planned in the fu-
ture.51 Given how quickly an attack can follow com-
pleted OPE, some decision-makers may consider 
any intrusion into an important network, such as 
a strategic military command-and-control network 
or a civilian network that supports military opera-
tions, to pose a serious threat. Weaker conventional 
military powers might lose vulnerable conventional 
or nuclear capabilities essential to staving off de-
feat.52 Stronger military powers might lose exqui-
site capabilities that enable a decisive victory but 
are less likely to succeed if information networks 
are degraded.53 Decision-makers might ideally pre-
fer to attribute the intrusion to its source and gath-
er information about the possible intent behind the 
intrusion before making a decision to respond with 
force. They might also prefer to expel the intruder 
from the network and conduct a thorough decon-
tamination effort. But both of those activities take 
time, which decision-makers do not have in a cri-
sis. The combination of time pressure and the po-
50   This could involve a state facing pressure to either “use or lose” its weapons or signal resolve in case its adversary’s conflict objectives expand in 
future. See, Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 189; Schelling, Arms and Influence, chap. 6; Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?” 57.
51   Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 2.
52   Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 2.
53   Acton, “Escalation Through Entanglement,” 73–76. In the context of nuclear operations, Acton refers to this inadvertent escalation pathway 
as a damage limitation window of opportunity.
54   For a discussion of military information network use-or-lose dynamics, see, Talmadge, “Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks,” 880.
55   Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 199.
56   For a similar argument about the impact of the onset of conflict on a state’s perceptions of its adversary’s military actions and intentions, 
see, Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?” 62–3.
57   Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 67–72.
58   Acton, “Escalation Through Entanglement,” 67–73. In the context of nuclear operations, Acton refers to this inadvertent escalation pathway 
as misinterpreted warning.
59   Rose McDermott, “Some Emotional Considerations in Cyber Conflict,” Journal of Cyber Policy 4, no. 3 (2019): 316, https://doi.org/10.1080/23
738871.2019.1701692. 
tential for diminished military effectiveness gives 
decision-makers an incentive to use force earlier 
than they otherwise might in a crisis.54
A second mechanism linking the discovery of an 
intrusion to the use of force concerns the effect 
of discovering the intrusion on the target’s assess-
ments of an adversary’s intentions. States tend to 
assume the worst about their adversary’s inten-
tions when they cannot distinguish between the 
offensive or defensive nature of a weapon.55 In ad-
dition, the adversary’s actions — those that helped 
to produce the crisis — are likely to confirm the 
state’s suspicions of its adversary’s hostile intent.56 
These dynamics are likely to lead decision-makers 
to assume the worst about the intent behind the 
intrusion: They will assume that it is OPE and not 
merely espionage.57 A state might even treat the 
discovery of an intrusion as an indicator that an 
adversary’s conventional attack is imminent.58 The 
combination of the crisis environment and OPE-es-
pionage distinction problem could lead the state 
to attribute aggressive intentions to the adversary 
with regards to both the network intrusion and the 
overall crisis, incentivizing the use of force rather 
than the pursuit of a diplomatic resolution. 
A third mechanism concerns decision-makers’ 
emotions. Rose McDermott argues that cyber oper-
ations are likely to trigger emotions of fear, anger, 
and surprise, all of which affect an individual’s lev-
els of optimism and risk-acceptance in their reac-
tions. In addition, “individuals differ systematically 
in their basic trait levels of fear and anger.”59 Fear is 
likely to lead to more pessimism and risk-avoidance 
in responses, which could prompt an individual to 
negotiate an end to a confrontation following a cy-
ber attack. Anger is likely to lead to more optimistic 
and risk-seeking behavior, which is more likely to 
lead to retaliation. If decision-makers are surprised 
by cyber attacks, they are more likely to hold others 
responsible for their effects. Surprised individuals 
might be more likely to judge cyber operations as 
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deliberate rather than accidental.60 These insights 
suggest that if decision-makers react to the surprise 
of discovering an intrusion with anger, they might 
be more likely to escalate to the use of force than 
continue to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. 
A final mechanism concerns the uneven distribu-
tion of information about the nature of cyber opera-
tions in national security bureaucracies. Intrusions 
that some cyber specialists see as a routine part of 
cyber operations may alarm more senior generalists, 
especially in a crisis. Top decision-makers may not 
have sufficient knowledge or information to assess 
the risks posed by a cyber intrusion to their military 
capabilities.61 Decision-makers generally have a hard 
time interpreting the nuances of cyber operations 
because they may not have a good understanding of 
those operations or may understand them through 
analogies that do not capture the complexity of cy-
ber OPE. For example, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Work once described fairly low-level oper-
ations against the Islamic State as “dropping cy-
berbombs.”62 Members of the bureaucracy who are 
more familiar with the routine part of cyber opera-
tions, such as the operators responsible for secur-
ing military networks, might not be in the situation 
room in a crisis to help decision-makers accurately 
assess the seriousness of the intrusion. 
The Deliberate Escalation Pathway
These four mechanisms explain how inadvertent 
escalation from an intrusion believed to be OPE 
could result in the use of force. However, scholars 
have questioned whether states make decisions 
to escalate because of the independent effects of 
technology alone. Based on historical case stud-
ies, Caitlin Talmadge argues that new technologies 
might not force decision-makers to take escalatory 
actions, but rather “seem likely to be an interven-
ing variable.” The technological characteristics of 
weapons that create risks of escalation “could en-
60   McDermott, “Some Emotional Considerations in Cyber Conflict,” 318–323.
61   Scholars of inadvertent escalation point to similar organizational dynamics within an attacking state. Military planners often do not involve 
civilians in operational planning and are slow to transmit information about ongoing operations to leaders. See, Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 16–19.
62   David Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat,” New York Times, April 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html.
63   Talmadge, “Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks,” 890, 868–9.
64   Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds, xii. 
65   Goldstein, “First Things First,” 75–77. 
66   See for example, Kreps and Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains”; Schneider, “The Information 
Revolution and International Stability”; Benjamin Jensen and Brandon Valeriano, What Do We Know About Cyber Escalation? Observations From 
Simulations and Surveys (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, November 2019); Valeriano and Maness, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities; Jensen, 
Valeriano, and Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion.
67   Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion; Borghard and Lonergan, “Cyber Operations 
as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” 131–3; Borghard and Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,” 466–71; Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar”; 
Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare”; Gartzke and Lindsay, “Politics by Many Other Means,” 21–4.
able or accelerate escalatory pressures originating 
elsewhere, particularly in state policies or military 
doctrines that intentionally seek to manipulate 
escalatory risk.” In other words, states seek out 
new technologies to enable them to increase risk 
of escalation, or turn to them opportunistically in 
a conflict, rather than their hands being forced to 
escalate in a crisis because they did not anticipate 
the escalatory pressures that their prior decisions 
to deploy certain military capabilities would cre-
ate.63 These actions constitute deliberate escala-
tion: “[when] a combatant deliberately increases 
the intensity or scope of an operation to gain an 
advantage or avoid defeat.”64
The deliberate escalation hypothesis suggests 
that states might assess that a cyber intrusion pos-
es a serious but tolerable threat, yet choose to use 
force in response because they have strategic and 
political incentives to escalate. Those strategic and 
political incentives usually involve gaining a mili-
tary advantage, signaling resolve, or preempting 
an adversary’s attempt to signal resolve by using 
force.65 A deliberate escalation pathway is unlike-
ly to involve emotional or organizational mecha-
nisms, but is likely to involve military disadvantage 
and misperception mechanisms. 
The Bluster De-Escalation Pathway
Decision-makers may decide not to use force if 
they discover an intrusion in a crisis — even if they 
are confident that the intruder has performed OPE 
— because they do not think the intrusion poses a 
serious threat. This hypothesis draws on existing 
empirical research, which indicates that cyber at-
tacks are perceived to be more bluster than bite. 
States and individuals tend not to retaliate in re-
sponse to cyber attacks.66 One explanation for this 
empirical finding is that decision-makers do not 
view cyber attacks as sufficiently damaging or de-
structive to warrant the use of force in response.67 
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Applying these arguments to a crisis scenario in 
which an intrusion is discovered, decision-makers 
might calculate that the cost of the cyber attack is 
likely to be low and can be absorbed. This expla-
nation suggests that states would not anticipate a 
military disadvantage from a cyber attack — the 
opposite outcome of the military disadvantage 
mechanism outlined above. 
Decision-makers might even view cyber attacks as 
a signal that an adversary intended to avoid a con-
ventional conflict. When the effects of cyber and 
kinetic attacks are held constant, U.S. survey re-
spondents were less likely to support retaliation for 
cyber attacks than kinetic attacks.68 Decision-mak-
ers might therefore interpret the discovery of an in-
trusion as a signal of an adversary’s intent to avoid 
crossing the threshold of conventional armed con-
flict,69 rather than its hostile intent — the opposite 
outcome of the misperception mechanism outlined 
above. A final reason decision-makers could assess 
that a cyber intrusion does not pose a serious threat 
is that they are confident that the threat of in-kind 
or cross-domain retaliation will deter the adversary 
from actually carrying out large-scale cyber attacks 
enabled by the intrusion.70 
The Countervailing De-Escalation Hypothesis
Finally, decision-makers might view the intru-
sion as posing a serious threat but have counter-
vailing political or strategic incentives not to re-
spond with the use of force. Decision-makers could 
react to an intrusion in this de-escalatory manner 
if they want to defuse the crisis for political or 
strategic reasons. States are likely to find them-
selves in this situation if the stakes of the crisis do 
not merit fighting a war, or if the state could not 
achieve its political objectives with conventional 
military operations. Decision-makers with multiple 
adversaries might also be wary of misattributing an 
intrusion carried out by one adversary to another 
if they cannot attribute the intrusion to its perpe-
trator with sufficient confidence in the time frame 
of the crisis.71 Other countervailing incentives may 
also originate in domestic politics. The ambiguity 
of intent behind cyber intrusions could help more 
moderate decision-makers build a coalition for re-
straint in the crisis and counter the policy prefer-
68   Kreps and Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains.” 
69   Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 296.
70   Scholars debate the effectiveness of efforts to deter cyber attacks with threats of in-kind or cross-domain retaliation. See, Nye, “Deterrence 
and Dissuasion in Cyberspace”; Schneider, “Deterrence In and Through Cyberspace,” 112–5. 
71   Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Attributing Cyber Attacks,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 32, https://doi.org/10.1080/0140
2390.2014.977382.
72   Carson, Secret Wars, 296. 
ences of more hawkish decision-makers.72 Any of 
the four mechanisms leading to inadvertent esca-
lation might apply in this pathway, but their effect 
on the use of force would be extinguished by coun-
tervailing incentives.
Evaluating Cyber Escalation Hypotheses
How might scholars determine which of these 
four hypotheses is most likely in a great-power cri-
sis? No political crisis has occurred between the 
United States and China (or Russia) since those 
countries acquired cyber capabilities in the mid-
2000s. No research design offers a perfect solution 
to the problem of assessing claims about events 
that have not occurred. To complement existing 
empirical studies involving U.S. participants, our 
approach focuses on capturing differences between 
U.S. and Chinese approaches to cyber conflict. Our 
empirical analysis in the next three sections is 
guided by the following observable implications of 
the four hypotheses outlined above.
The inadvertent escalation hypothesis would ex-
pect states to express concern about any intrusions 
into their networks and to recognize the OPE-espi-
onage distinction problem. States might also recog-
nize inadvertent escalation risks and take steps to 
manage cyber escalation risks in their procedures, 
authorities, and cyber operations organization-
al structures. Inadvertent escalation is also more 
likely to occur when two states have a poor under-
standing of each other’s cyber activities and lack 
crisis communications mechanisms to verify the 
nature of an intrusion. A lack of recognition of in-
advertent escalation risks could support either the 
inadvertent escalation hypothesis or the bluster 
de-escalation hypothesis. A state that possesses 
good attribution capabilities, defends its network 
against intrusions, and effectively repels intrud-
ers who do breach defenses might be less likely to 
experience worrying intrusions. States possessing 
those capabilities might also be able to better as-
sess the intent and the severity of the threat posed 
by an intrusion. Those capabilities are more likely 
to support the bluster de-escalation hypothesis.
While it is difficult to describe the strategic and 
political incentives that could provide evidence to 
support the deliberate escalation or countervailing 
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hypotheses in a future crisis, some ex ante features 
of a great-power relationship would shape those 
incentives. Deliberate escalation is more likely to 
occur when the state discovering the intrusion is 
conventionally stronger than its adversary, does 
not confront multiple nation-state adversaries in 
cyberspace, or has high political stakes in the cri-
sis. The countervailing hypothesis is more likely to 
find support if the state discovering the intrusion 
is conventionally weaker than its adversary, faces 
multiple nation-state adversaries in cyberspace, 
or has low political stakes in the crisis. Reflecting 
our intent to examine the most likely case for inad-
vertent escalation resulting from cyber operations, 
a crisis scenario between the United States and 
China is less likely to support the countervailing 
de-escalation hypothesis than other dyads. The 
conventional military balance between these two 
states is becoming more equal.73 The independent 
effect of cyber technology on Chinese incentives to 
use force is therefore less likely to be obfuscated 
by strategic disincentives to use force.
Escalation Risks in U.S. 
Cyber Operations
Evidence from the United States indicates that the 
country’s decision-makers recognize the inadvertent 
escalation risks posed by cyber operations and OPE 
in particular. But U.S. decision-makers have taken 
steps to mitigate those risks. The Obama adminis-
tration implemented organizational practices that 
carefully managed cyber operations that could pro-
duce escalation. The Trump administration relaxed 
those organizational practices after gaining confi-
dence in operational practices, such as persistent 
defenses, a policy of more actively thwarting would-
be intruders, and good attribution capabilities. In 
this manner, evidence from the United States sup-
ports both the inadvertent escalation hypothesis 
and the bluster de-escalation hypothesis. As part 
of its more aggressive approach, U.S. Cyber Com-
mand has also concluded that most cyber intrusions 
could not produce serious enough effects to result 
in escalation. This judgment could support the blus-
73   Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. 
Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power, 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).
74   For example, Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Jan. 29, 2019, https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1947-statement-for-the-record-worldwide-
threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community.
75   Shane Smith, “Cyberspies, Nukes, and the New Cold War: Shane Smith Interviews Ashton Carter (Part 1),” Vice, May 15, 2015, 2:13, https://
www.vice.com/en/article/xw3b4n/cyberspies-nukes-and-the-new-cold-war-shane-smith-interviews-ashton-carter-part-1.
76   Paul M. Nakasone and Michael Sulmeyer, “How to Compete in Cyberspace,” Foreign Affairs, Aug. 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/united-states/2020-08-25/cybersecurity.
ter de-escalation hypothesis and the countervailing 
de-escalation hypothesis. U.S. adversaries might 
view its intrusions as very threatening but face stra-
tegic and political incentives not to use force, espe-
cially given their conventional military inferiority to 
the United States.
Leadership Views of OPE
The public statements of U.S. leaders and U.S. gov-
ernment reactions to discoveries of intrusions into 
military networks indicate that the United States 
views intrusions as threatening, in part because they 
could be used either for OPE or intelligence gather-
ing. At the worldwide threat briefing each year since 
2010, the director of national intelligence has placed 
the risk of foreign hacking as the top national secu-
rity threat facing the United States.74 After a Russian 
hack of Pentagon systems in 2015 that the United 
States was able to repel, then-Secretary of Defense 
Ash Carter summarized the American position apt-
ly when he said, “[It] can’t be good for anybody to 
be inside of our networks — whatever their motiva-
tion.”75 Similarly, Gen. Paul Nakasone, the head of 
the National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber 
Command, wrote in an essay with his adviser Mi-
chael Sulmeyer that the United States turned to a 
more aggressive policy “to prevent toeholds from 
turning into beachheads so that a single compro-
mise will not threaten the military’s ability to ac-
complish its mission.”76 The clarity of this expressed 
vision — strongly pushing back against any kind of 
foreign hacking of crucial systems — is remarkable 
and indicative of current U.S. policy. 
While most U.S. responses to foreign hacking ef-
forts are highly classified, two historical cases show 
how U.S. policymakers worried about the implica-
tions of minor intrusions. In a 1998 hack known as 
Solar Sunrise, intruders penetrated the U.S. mili-
tary’s logistics and communications networks. The 
Joint Staff general in charge of information opera-
tions, John Campbell, worried that the breach would 
permit significant attacks, especially at a time of 
heightened tensions with Iraq. “If you take one part 
of that machine, and disable it,” he said, “you[‘ve] 
got a real problem trying to make a deployment take 
Preparing the Cyber Battlefield: Assessing a Novel Escalation Risk in a Sino-American Crisis
67
Deliberate escalation is more likely 
to occur when the state discovering 
the intrusion is conventionally 
stronger than its adversary, does 
not confront multiple nation-state 
adversaries in cyberspace, or has 
high political stakes in the crisis.
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place.”77 Campbell’s comments reflect an assess-
ment that the intrusion could have placed the Unit-
ed States at a military disadvantage in a conflict. The 
discovery did not take place during a major crisis 
and therefore lacked the time pressure element that 
would create incentives to use force. Nevertheless, it 
was only after various parts of the U.S. government 
spun up to prepare for a response that an investi-
gation concluded the breach was the work of three 
teenagers and their 20-year-old mentor. In short, be-
cause of OPE’s dangers, even hacks carried out for 
kicks and bragging rights caused major alarm in the 
U.S. government.
In another case, Moonlight Maze, U.S. policymak-
ers responded with great alarm. The attack occurred 
in 1998 and 1999 and involved Russian penetration 
of unclassified American networks. The U.S. govern-
ment hacked back into Russian computers in order 
to gain more intelligence.78 One of the White House’s 
top national security officials, Richard Clarke, la-
beled the activities “cyberwar reconnaissance.”79 
Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre 
went still further, telling the Intelligence Commit-
tees of Congress in a classified briefing that the 
United States was “in the middle of a cyber war.”80 
These comments indicate once more that U.S. deci-
sion-makers view intelligence collection as enabling 
the use of force in cyberspace.
OPE in Cyber Operations
U.S. operators and decision-makers have recog-
nized the need for OPE to conduct sophisticated 
cyber operations since at least 2010. The vice chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a memo in 
2010 mandating the use of the term “Cyber Oper-
ations in Preparation of the Environment,” which 
referred to those cyber operations that serve “as an 
enabling function for another military operation.” 
This updated a 2005 instruction that was more 
vague but nonetheless referred to the need to shape 
the digital environment in order to aid operations.81 
77   Thomas Rid, Rise of the Machines: A Cybernetic History (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 315.
78   Rid, Rise of the Machines, 327.
79   Rid, Rise of the Machines, 336.
80   “‘We’re in the Middle of a Cyberwar,’” Newsweek, Sept. 19, 1999, https://www.newsweek.com/were-middle-cyerwar-166196. See also, Rid, 
Rise of the Machines, 338. 
81   The earlier instruction said, “[The Defense Department] will use [computer] network exploitation to gather intelligence and shape the cyber-
space environment as necessary to provide integrated offensive and defensive options.” See, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National 
Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, 2006, 2, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=35693. For the later instruction, see, Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum: Subject: Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations,” 2010, 7, http://www.nsci-va.org/CyberRefer-
enceLib/2010-11-Joint%20Terminology%20for%20Cyberspace%20Operations.pdf.
82   U.S. Strategic Command, “CYBERCOM Announcement Message,” May 21, 2010, 2, from “The United States and Cyberspace: Military Orga-
nization, Policies, and Activities,” National Security Archive, Jan. 20, 2016, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cyber-vault/2016-01-20/unit-
ed-states-cyberspace-military-organization-policies-activities. 
83   “Fact Sheet on Presidential Policy Directive 20,” The White House, Federation of American Scientists, 2012, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/
ppd-20-fs.pdf.
From the earliest days of the U.S. Cyber Command, 
secret documents — now declassified — indicated 
that conducting OPE was one of its core tasks.82
Planners at the highest levels of the U.S. govern-
ment eventually recognized the importance of OPE. 
During the Obama administration, the most signifi-
cant high-level document governing America’s offen-
sive cyber capability was Presidential Policy Direc-
tive 20 (PPD-20). The president signed the classified 
document in secret in the fall of 2012, but the White 
House released a fact sheet that provided a limited 
level of detail. In the fact sheet, the White House 
made no mention of offensive cyber capabilities. In-
stead, it stated that the new policy “enables us to 
be flexible” and emphasized the White House plans 
on “exercising restraint.” The United States “shall 
undertake the least action necessary to mitigate 
threats” and “will prioritize network defense and 
law enforcement as preferred courses of action.”83 In 
short, the unclassified readout of PPD-20 suggests a 
posture that pays little attention to either offensive 
action or to the preparation required to enable it. 
But the full classified document, leaked in 2013 
by Edward Snowden, reveals a strategy that direct-
ly considers offensive action and contrasts it with 
other forms of cyber operations. The strategy de-
fines a clear typology of cyber activity. This includes 
“cyber collection,” which refers to intelligence-gath-
ering activities for purposes other than offensive 
preparation. It also includes “non-intrusive defen-
sive countermeasures,” meaning steps taken within 
one’s own network, such as deploying antivirus and 
other basic security measures. PPD-20 refers to oth-
er authorities and plans that govern both sets of ac-
tivities. The document also introduces the concept 
of “Defensive Cyber Effects Operations.” It defines 
these activities as efforts that have an effect on an 
adversary’s computer systems — presumably, hack-
ing or other interference — but only for the pur-
poses of defense. For example, one could imagine 
a basic scenario in which an adversary is launching 
a cyber operation against American targets, and the 
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United States conducts a basic cyber attack to in-
terfere with the adversary’s internet connectivity 
and inhibit the adversary’s action. PPD-20 provides 
high-level procedures for managing this kind of ag-
gressive defensive action.84 
Most significantly, though, the classified version of 
PPD-20 defines offensive action in more detail than 
the declassified fact sheet. It introduces the concept 
of “Offensive Cyber Effects Operations” (OCEO). 
This is the class of activities that are not cyber col-
lection, non-intrusive defensive countermeasures, 
or defensive cyber effects operations. Instead, these 
efforts are designed to cause effects in adversary 
networks.85 The document extols the unique virtues 
of these kinds of offensive cyber operations, which 
“can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to 
advance U.S. national objectives around the world 
with little or no warning to the adversary or target 
and with potential effects ranging from subtle to se-
verely damaging.”86 
PPD-20 acknowledges the need for OPE to bring 
these offensive options to fruition. The document’s 
authors explicitly recognize the preparation need-
ed to develop such capabilities: “The development 
and sustainment of [offensive cyber] capabilities, 
however, may require considerable time and effort if 
access and tools for a specific target do not already 
exist.”87 PPD-20 directs the U.S. government to begin 
this operational preparation. The relevant agencies 
“shall identify potential targets of national impor-
tance where OCEO can offer a favorable balance of 
effectiveness and risk as compared with other instru-
ments of national power, [and] establish and main-
tain OCEO capabilities integrated as appropriate with 
other U.S. offensive capabilities.”88 In so doing, PPD-
20’s authors reveal that they understand what is re-
quired to enable offensive capabilities and that they 
believe the United States should — in secret — take 
those steps. With his signature, President Barack 
Obama authorized the preparatory activity. 
Procedures for Managing Escalation Risks
PPD-20 reveals U.S. policymakers’ cognizance 
of the risks that arise from actually using offen-
sive cyber capabilities. As a result, as much as it 
discusses and authorizes preparation of the en-
84   Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20, Subject: U.S. Cyber Operations Policy,” Oct. 16, 2012, 2–3, from National Security 
Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=2725521-Document-2-9.
85   Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20,” 2–3.
86   Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20,” 9. 
87   Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20,” 9. 
88   Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20,” 9. 
89   Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20,” 9. 
90   Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20,” 3. 
vironment, the document highlights a process to 
carefully manage offensive actions that might do 
serious harm or invite escalation. The document 
emphasizes interagency coordination, balancing 
defense and national security interests with diplo-
matic and economic ones. Most notably, the pro-
cess requires the highest level of executive branch 
oversight — presidential approval — for any cyber 
operation that is “reasonably likely to result in sig-
nificant consequences.”89 This term is broadly de-
fined: “Loss of life, significant responsive actions 
against the United States, significant damage to 
property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy con-
sequences, or serious economic impact on the 
United States.”90 It is likely that cyber operations 
that do not meet that threshold could otherwise be 
approved by the agency carrying out the operation 
without such high-level interagency vetting.
Crucially, PPD-20 does not limit these restrictions 
to cyber attacks, but emphasizes that they apply to 
all cyber operations. In short, Obama wanted di-
rect oversight of any operation that might meet the 
threshold of significant consequences — regardless 
of whether that operation involved collecting intel-
ligence, defending American computers, prepar-
ing an offensive capability, or launching an attack. 
While it is impossible to know how agencies inter-
preted this directive, there seems to be little doubt 
that the Obama administration was concerned, at 
least in theory, about the risks of cyber escalation 
even as it appreciated the operational necessity to 
prepare offensive capabilities in advance. 
The Trump administration has adopted a more 
relaxed set of organizational procedures for manag-
ing cyber escalation risks. Upon unveiling its new 
national cyber strategy in 2018, the Trump White 
House specifically chastised the preceding admin-
istration for what it saw as its overly cautious pos-
ture and promised to be more aggressive in its en-
gagements with adversaries. Then-National Security 
Adviser John Bolton said, “Our hands are not tied 
as they were in the Obama administration.” Oth-
er White House and Defense Department officials 
supported the same theme: It was time to take the 
gloves off. Nor was the need for more aggressive ac-
tion just a partisan view. In his confirmation hearing, 
the incoming NSA director and commander of U.S. 
The Scholar
70
Cyber Command Gen. Paul Nakasone warned that 
the United States had to do more because American 
adversaries “don’t fear us.”91
To translate this rhetoric into policy, President 
Donald Trump signed “National Security Presiden-
tial Memorandum 13.” The goal of the memoran-
dum, which remains classified, is to provide mil-
itary commanders greater flexibility to integrate 
cyber operations into their overall approach to 
warfighting and deterrence.92 By delegating this au-
thority to the Pentagon, the Trump administration 
attempted to foster a faster and more aggressive 
process, one that will generate more operational 
effects more quickly. But this approach also re-
balanced the trade-off between operational agility 
and whole-of-government coordination to manage 
cyber escalation risks in favor of the former. Ac-
cording to the general on the Joint Staff respon-
sible for cyber operations, this change marked a 
notable contrast to the Obama administration’s 
approach, which was “an interagency process that 
went through the National Security Council … to 
deputies’ committee to principals’ committee and 
[where], in effect, anyone could stop the process 
along the way.” Nor, he argued, was the distinction 
just semantics or bureaucratic minutia, but one 
that “makes all the difference in the world in terms 
of the speed at which you can move.”93 
Unlike PPD-20, the Trump memo has not leaked. 
It is impossible to know whether this new policy 
frees commanders to both launch cyber capabili-
ties and prepare to do so. But there are hints that 
the memo and complementary legislative changes 
implemented by Congress provide a freer hand in 
developing the malicious code and gaining access 
to target networks required to provide command-
ers with offensive options. For example, in a recent 
media interview, the former deputy commander 
91   David E. Sanger, “Trump Loosens Secretive Restraints on Ordering Cyberattacks,” New York Times, Sept. 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/09/20/us/politics/trump-cyberattacks-orders.html. 
92   Mark Pomerleau, “New Cyber Authority Could Make ‘All the Difference in the World,’” Fifth Domain, Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.fifthdomain.
com/dod/cybercom/2018/09/17/new-cyber-authority-could-make-all-the-difference-in-the-world/.
93   Pomerleau, “New Cyber Authority Could Make ‘All the Difference in the World’”; Sydney Freedberg, “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Re-
main: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, Sept. 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain-joint-staff/.
94   Mark Pomerleau, “Is Cyber Command Really Being More ‘Aggressive’ in Cyberspace?” Fifth Domain, April 25, 2019, quoted in Jason Healey, “The Im-
plications of Persistent (and Permanent) Engagement in Cyberspace,” Journal of Cybersecurity 5, no. 1 (2019): 3, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyz008. 
95   David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid,” New York Times, June 15, 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber-russia-grid.html. 
96   Nakashima, “White House Authorizes ‘Offensive Cyber Operations’ to Deter Foreign Adversaries,” Washington Post, Sept. 20, 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-authorizes-offensive-cyber-operations-to-deter-foreign-adversar-
ies-bolton-says/2018/09/20/b5880578-bd0b-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html. 
97   U.S. Cyber Command, Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command, March 2018, 3, https://www.
cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010. 
of U.S. Cyber Command, Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, 
indicated that changes to congressional legislation 
“freed us up to do some of the things, the oper-
ational preparation of the environment, that we 
were limited from doing outside of the counterter-
rorism mission and now can do much more broad-
ly against all of our peers and competitors.”94 In 
addition, a New York Times story from June 2019 
describes more aggressive American preparatory 
measures against the Russian power grid.95 
Overall, the Trump administration seems much 
less worried about the escalation risk associated 
with cyber operations than the Obama administra-
tion. Michael Daniel, the former coordinator for cy-
ber security in the Obama White House, observed 
that the Trump administration “is willing to take 
more risks than previous administrations, but the 
proof will be in the results.”96 While the adminis-
tration’s approach remains untested in a crisis with 
a near-peer competitor, it has been informed by the 
U.S. experience with cyber conflict over the past 
decade as well as the increasing risk tolerance of 
U.S. decision-makers. To justify its new posture, 
U.S. Cyber Command has argued that “adversaries 
continuously operate against us below the thresh-
old of armed conflict,” in what it described as a 
“new normal.”97 Moreover, the command argued 
that U.S. efforts to counter this adversarial activity 
will not lead to retaliation in or outside of cyber-
space that would cross that threshold. 
These claims have been fiercely debated in the 
academic literature, with critics of the so-called 
persistent engagement approach arguing that the 
new strategy could produce escalation. For exam-
ple, some contend that the thresholds for armed 
conflict are not as clear as U.S. Cyber Command 
has suggested. Others argue that persistent en-
gagement creates too many red lines for adver-
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saries and is therefore not a realistic means for 
shaping behavior.98 Engaging with this debate, Na-
kasone and Sulmeyer wrote: 
The thinking goes that by competing more 
proactively in cyberspace, the risk of mis-
calculation, error, or accident increases and 
could escalate to a crisis. Cyber Command 
takes these concerns seriously, and reducing 
this risk is a critical part of the planning pro-
cess. We are confident that this more pro-
active approach enables Cyber Command to 
conduct operations that impose costs while 
responsibly managing escalation.99
Capabilities for Managing Escalation Risks
In the past decade, the United States has devel-
oped some of the world’s most sophisticated cyber 
capabilities to better defend its networks, attrib-
ute intrusions, and expel intruders in peacetime. 
To better defend networks, the United States has 
invested in major systems, such as EINSTEIN 3, 
that aim to thwart intrusions. To improve rapid 
attribution of intrusions and increase situational 
awareness, the United States established various 
cross-agency working groups and bulked up teams 
within the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command. To the 
extent that these capabilities work — which is hard 
to judge — they mitigate cyber escalation risks by 
reducing the likelihood that intruders will suc-
cessfully break into U.S. networks and alarm pol-
icymakers who have to decide on how to respond 
within the compressed time period of a crisis. 
Escalation Risks in Chinese 
Cyber Operation
The sources providing evidence of China’s ap-
proach to cyber operations are older, scarcer, and 
less authoritative than those for the United States. 
Nevertheless, they still offer valuable insights for 
policy and scholarly debates about cyber conflict, 
which rarely draw on Chinese empirics. These 
sources suggest that China is much less cognizant of 
the inadvertent escalation risks posed by OPE than 
the United States. Indeed, there is little evidence 
that China has scrutinized these risks as carefully 
98   For arguments in favor of persistent engagement, see, Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett, Persistent Engagement, Agreed 
Competition, Cyberspace Interaction Dynamics, and Escalation (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2018); Richard J. Harknett and 
Michael P. Fischerkeller, “What Is Agreed Competition in Cyberspace?” Lawfare, Feb. 19, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-agreed-compe-
tition-cyberspace. For critiques, see, Healey, “The Implications of Persistent (and Permanent) Engagement in Cyberspace”; Max Smeets, “There Are 
Too Many Red Lines in Cyberspace,” Lawfare, March 20, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/there-are-too-many-red-lines-cyberspace. See also, 
Aaron Brantly, ed., The Cyber Deterrence Problem (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020). 
99   Nakasone and Sulmeyer, “How to Compete in Cyberspace.” 
as the United States. This lack of attention could be 
evidence of the bluster de-escalation hypothesis, as 
it might reflect a judgment that inadvertent escala-
tion risks are manageable. But it is more likely that 
there is a lack of awareness of these inadvertent es-
calation risks in China. In addition, China will also 
face weaker countervailing strategic incentives not 
to use force in response to cyber intrusions in the 
future compared with the past, as it continues to 
chip away at the decisive U.S. conventional military 
advantage in the Indo-Pacific.
China’s apparent lack of awareness of the inad-
vertent escalation risks associated with OPE could 
help to realize such risks in a crisis for three rea-
sons. First, China is more likely to misperceive U.S. 
cyber intrusions. Second, it is more likely to over-
look the ways that its own cyber intrusions could 
be misperceived. Third, China is much less likely to 
take steps to mitigate these risks. Available sourc-
es provide no evidence that the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) has practices to manage inadvertent 
escalation. However, China is investing in cyber sit-
uational awareness to improve its network defenses 
and attribution capabilities. These measures could 
mitigate cyber escalation risks in the future, even if 
they are not pursued with this purpose in mind. 
The Chinese government does not officially ac-
knowledge that the PLA has an offensive cyber 
operations capability. The authoritativeness, com-
pleteness, and availability of sources with which to 
assess China’s views of cyber escalation risks are 
more limited as a result. But China’s offensive cy-
ber capabilities are acknowledged in the teaching, 
research, and strategy publications of influential 
PLA organizations such as the Academy of Military 
Science and National Defense University. The PLA’s 
official newspaper and cyber security publications 
associated with civilian bodies also discuss offen-
sive cyber capabilities. This article examines those 
sources, in accordance with the best practices for 
open-source research on Chinese military strategy.
Leadership Views of OPE
Chinese policymakers’ fears about foreign hack-
ers have grown in tandem with the expansion of the 
Chinese government and military’s dependence on 
computer networks. In a major speech on national 
cyber security policy in 2016, Communist Party Gen-
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eral Secretary Xi Jinping stated that, “Cyber security 
has a strong covert character; a technological vul-
nerability or security risk can stay hidden for a num-
ber of years without being discovered.” As a result, 
“we do not know who came in, whether it was an 
enemy or a friend, or what they did.” Xi implied that 
while this enemy or friend’s intrusion could remain 
“latent” inside a network for a long time, it could be 
“activated whenever (yidan jiu fazuo le).”100 
The Chinese government has not publicly ac-
knowledged any specific incidents in which it dis-
covered that foreign state actors had exploited its 
government or military networks. The closest an-
alogue to the Solar Sunrise and Moonlight Maze 
incidents outlined above for China was Edward 
Snowden’s revelations regarding U.S. govern-
ment surveillance of Chinese computer networks. 
Snowden’s revelations are often cited by the coun-
try’s cyber security scholars as evidence of China’s 
100   Xi Jinping, Zai wangluo anquan he xinxihua gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jiangzuo [Speech at the cybersecurity and informatization work 
symposium] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2016), 17. 
101   Lyu Jinghua, Meiguo wangluo kongjianzhan sixiang yanjiu [A study of U.S. thought on cyber warfare] (Beijing: Junshi kexueyuan chubanshe, 
2014), 241. 
102   “The CIA Hacking Group (APT-C-39) Conducts Cyber-Espionage Operation on China’s Critical Industries for 11 Years,” Qihoo 360 Threat 
Intelligence Center, March 2, 2020, https://blogs.360.cn/post/APT-C-39_CIA_EN.html. 
103   Cai Jun, He Jun, and Yu Xiaohong, “Meijun wangluo kongjian zuozhan lilun [Theories of U.S. cyberspace operations],” Zhongguo junshi kexue 
[China military science] 1 (2018): 151.
104   See for example, Lu Chuanying, “Forging Stability in Cyberspace,” Survival 62, no. 2 (2020): 128, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1739959. 
vulnerability. They claim that the NSA also targeted 
the country’s military networks.101 A Chinese cyber 
security firm reported that the CIA had spied on 
Chinese state-owned enterprises, but did not identi-
fy any government networks penetrated.102 There is 
no detailed evidence about how the Chinese govern-
ment responded to any of these incidents, nor did 
they occur in the context of a major crisis. 
Chinese writings examining U.S. cyber opera-
tions do not mention the crisis escalation risks that 
could result from the OPE-espionage distinction 
problem. Chinese military experts note that OPE 
is one of the cyber missions outlined in U.S. doc-
trinal publications.103 While the Trump administra-
tion’s military cyber policy changes have garnered 
attention and concern among Chinese authors, the 
authors are less focused on crisis escalation risks 
than American scholars.104 A researcher with the 
Academy of Military Science Military Information 
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Research Center examining the Command Vision 
for U.S. Cyber Command from March 2018 high-
lighted the overall framework of pursuing superi-
ority and the strategy’s emphasis on preemption.105 
Former PLA Col. Lyu Jinghua highlighted the dan-
ger of intensified arms racing resulting from Amer-
ica’s new approach.106 However, there is little ev-
idence to suggest that Chinese decision-makers’ 
views on the escalation risks of OPE are as devel-
oped as those of their U.S. counterparts. 
OPE in Cyber Operations
Like U.S. officials, PLA strategists also distin-
guish between cyber surveillance, offense and de-
fense, and deterrence as the main styles of cyber 
struggle.107 PLA texts do not use the term “opera-
tional preparation of the environment” when de-
scribing PLA operations, but they do recognize that 
effective offensive cyber operations require exten-
sive advance preparation. A 2015 book authored by 
individuals from PLA research institutes and ed-
ucational organizations acknowledges that signif-
icant advance preparations are needed to ensure 
that cyber operations can be used to diminish an 
adversary’s combat power. While many methods 
of attack are available, “a cyber attack capable of 
producing significant effects is a cyber attack for 
which ample preparations have already been made 
at an earlier time … it is not a decision that one 
makes as the situation requires.”108 
PLA writings indicate that China places a similar 
degree of emphasis on OPE as the United States. 
One PLA text characterizes OPE as more demand-
ing than network exploitation for espionage: 
It is necessary to carry out careful and me-
ticulous reconnaissance and scanning of the 
105   Tan Yushan, “Toushi: Telangpu Zhengfu wangluo anquan mian mianguan [Perspective: A comprehensive survey of cybersecurity un-
der the Trump Administration],” Zhongguo xinxi anquan [China information security] 7 (2018): 89, http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTo-
tal-CINS201807035.htm.
106   Lyu Jinghua, “Daguo hezuo yinling wangluo kongjian guoji zhixu cong chongtu zouxiang wending [Great power cooperation showing the way 
in the cyberspace international order from conflict towards stability],” Zhongguo xinxi anquan [China information security] 11 (2018): 34, http://
www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-CINS201811017.htm. See also, Lyu Jinghua, “A Chinese Perspective on the Pentagon’s Cyber Strategy: From 
‘Active Cyber Defense’ to ‘Defending Forward,’” Lawfare, Oct. 18, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-perspective-pentagons-cyber-strate-
gy-active-cyber-defense-defending-forward.
107   Shou Xiaosong, ed., Zhanlue xue [The science of military strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexueyuan chubanshe, 2013), 192–4; Xiao Tianliang, ed., 
Zhanlue xue [The science of military strategy], revised edition (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2017), 150–152; Ye Zheng, ed., Xinxi zuozhan xue 
jiaocheng [Study guide to information warfare] (Junshi kexueyuan chubanshe, 2013), 167–8, 177–8, 207–8. 
108   Li Zhaorui, ed., Wangluo zhan jichu yu fazhan qushi [Cyber war foundations and development trends] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2015), 
71. The book’s editorial committee includes individuals from the PLA Army Engineering University and the PLA’s 54th Institute. The 54th Institute 
was consolidated into the Strategic Support Force in 2016. Before then, it was affiliated with the PLA General Staff Department’s Fourth Depart-
ment, which was believed to be responsible for the PLA’s offensive cyber operations capability. See, Elsa B. Kania and John K. Costello, “The Strate-
gic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations,” The Cyber Defense Review 3 (Spring 2018): 111, https://cyberdefensereview.
army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/1589125/the-strategic-support-force-and-the-future-of-chinese-information-operations/.
109   Li, Wangluo zhan jichu yu fazhan qushi, 72.
110   Li, Wangluo zhan jichu yu fazhan qushi, 72–6.
111   Li, Wangluo zhan jichu yu fazhan qushi, 75.
target, in order to obtain even more detailed, 
specific information about it. As such, we 
must carry out deeper reconnaissance and 
scanning of the target, [and] the extent of 
secrecy and concealment [of those tasks] far 
exceeds the extent of carrying out [those] 
tasks for computer network exploitation.109 
But reconnaissance and scanning are only the 
first steps in preparations for an attack. The au-
thors emphasize the importance of obfuscation 
throughout the various procedures required to 
prepare for offensive cyber operations: selecting 
and employing a method of gaining access to the 
target, moving laterally through the network, gain-
ing system administrator or root directory privileg-
es, and maintaining access to the network. Using 
false flags makes it seem as if another actor carried 
out the attack.110 An intrusion can serve multiple 
purposes: “attack actions occur after the intrusion 
of computer networks, escalating privileges and 
exfiltrating all required data.”111
PLA writings recognize that holding targets at 
risk for the purpose of deterrence also requires 
OPE. An article outlining principles of cyber de-
terrence authored by an unnamed Academy of 
Military Science “expert” in 2016 indicated that 
successful cyber deterrence, which included 
carrying out coercive and retaliatory attacks, re-
quired “complete and meticulous preparation in 
peacetime.” Those preparations included “long-
term, sustained network reconnaissance” to be-
come familiar with an adversary’s network sit-
uation, map the structure of its networks, and 
discover hardware and software vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities could be used to leave backdoors, 
set up “springboards,” and install logic bombs 
and Trojan horses “to retain points of penetration 
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to launch future cyber attacks.”112 
Chinese strategy texts recognize the OPE-es-
pionage distinction problem. The 2013 Science 
of Military Strategy published by the Academy 
of Military Science acknowledges that, “from a 
technological perspective, the principles of the 
task (gongzuo yuanli) of cyber surveillance and 
cyber attacks are essentially identical.” The book 
explains: “cyber surveillance means and methods 
are often also the means and methods of cyber 
attacks.” Furthermore, it highlights that cyber es-
pionage can easily be turned into an attack: “Ac-
cording to the aspirations and intentions of the 
actor, it is possible to just press a key or initiate 
a sequence of commands, and the conversion be-
tween cyber surveillance and cyber attack is im-
mediately completed.” The authors conclude that 
the relationship between cyber espionage and 
combat cannot be severed.113 
PLA texts imply that the requirement for OPE 
can erode the distinction between peacetime and 
conflict in cyberspace. The 2017 Science of Mili-
tary Strategy published by the National Defense 
University indicates that, “compared to traditional 
domains, the boundary between war and peace in 
the cyber domain is fuzzier.” The book describes 
the lack of clear boundaries as follows: “cyber and 
electronic domain warfare already exists in peace-
time; when war is imminent (linzhan) it becomes 
more intense; [and] often sustained confrontation 
directly merges into actual war.”114 Two PLA authors 
affiliated with the former General Staff Research In-
stitute argue that the law of armed conflict is diffi-
cult to apply to cyberspace because “war and peace 
are hard to distinguish.” One reason for this blurred 
boundary is that “‘backdoors’ and ‘exploits’ are 
112   “Junshi Kexue Yuan zhuanjia jiemi wangluo kongjian weishe [Academy of Military Sciences expert reveals cyberspace deterrence],” China 
Military Online, Jan. 6, 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0106/c1011-28020408.html.
113   Shou, Zhanlue xue, 192.
114   Xiao, Zhanlue xue, 148, 229. See also, Li, Wangluo zhan Jichu yu fazhan qushi, 71.
115   Yu Saisai and Du Yucong, “Wangluo zhan dui xiandai zhanzheng fa tixi de yingxiang,” Waiguo junshi xueshu [Foreign military arts] 5 (2015): 71.
116   Zhou Xinsheng, ed., Junzhong zhanlue jiaocheng [Study guide to military service strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexue yuan chubanshe, 2013), 126. 
pre-placed in an enemy’s network systems early; it 
is very difficult to determine from which moment 
war begins.”115 This view contrasts with U.S. Cyber 
Command’s views of a clearer threshold of armed 
conflict in cyberspace, although PLA views of cyber 
conflict might have been updated since these texts 
were published.
As in the United States, PLA texts indicate that 
China intends to conduct offensive cy-
ber operations. OPE will therefore 
likely be necessary to target the 
high-value military and civilian 
critical infrastructure networks 
that could cause cyber escalation 
risks in a crisis. A 2013 Academy 
of Military Science textbook de-
scribes “‘soft’ paralysis of the in-
formation network nodes of adver-
sary warfare systems” that the PLA 
could implement alongside kinetic 
attacks and psychological operations 
in a future joint information operations 
campaign. The book indicates that the PLA would 
need to “completely analyze the structure and rela-
tionship of interconnections and restrictions among 
the adversary’s systems for command and control, 
intelligence and warning, and firepower attack (huo-
li daji), and their support and sustainment,” in order 
to select the appropriate means for offensive cyber 
attacks. Those means include the types of offensive 
cyber operations that would require OPE: “systems 
intrusion, computer virus attacks, attacks to cut off 
servers, and network deception attacks.” The book 
indicates that PLA attacks would not be limited to 
military networks, but could also “infiltrate, attack, 
and paralyze the adversary’s important civilian net-
works (minyong wangluo xitong).”116 The PLA might 
have moderated its expectations of the difficulty 
and effectiveness of such attacks as it has learned 
more about offensive cyber operations over time.
Procedures for Managing Escalation Risk
Unlike official U.S. documents, PLA texts do not 
recognize the danger of the OPE-espionage distinc-
tion problem and the risk of escalation if an intru-
sion is discovered in a crisis. It is unclear whether 
the PLA has implemented procedures for managing 
inadvertent escalation risks posed by its cyber op-
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erations, but its writings do not suggest that man-
aging those risks was a priority in organizational 
procedures for cyber operations in the past. This 
inattention is somewhat surprising given that Chi-
na has recently paid more attention to three other 
escalation risks: deliberate cyber attacks that could 
result in an adversary overreaction, unauthorized 
and accidental cyber attacks perpetrated by the 
PLA, and the prospects of being drawn into a con-
flict by North Korean cyber attacks. 
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy indicates 
that “every country in the world is conducting cyber 
reconnaissance activities of differing degrees, but 
the possibility of this triggering a bilateral crisis, or 
a war starting because of this reason, is not high.”117 
The authors do not reconcile this observation with 
their observation that cyber surveillance and at-
tacks are indistinguishable. Similarly, the Academy 
of Military Science expert writing in 2016 warned of 
escalation risks from cyber operations that are too 
weak or too strong in their effects on an adversary. 
The expert called for unified control over all aspects 
of cyber operations but did not recognize the possi-
bility that espionage could be misperceived as OPE 
and prompt an adversary to use force.118 
Chinese researchers writing for academic and 
policy audiences vary in their assessments of 
whether cyber operations contribute to incentives 
to use force in a crisis, but they also do not pay 
much attention to the specific OPE inadvertent es-
calation pathway. Associate Professor Liu Yangyue 
at the National University of Defense Technology 
is generally sanguine about the effects of cyber op-
erations on strategic stability. He dismisses the ar-
gument in Western literature that a state could es-
calate in response to an initial cyber attack to stop 
an adversary from conducting further attacks.119 
Drawing on the same observational data used in 
Western cyber security scholarship, he argues that 
“when they face cyber attacks (believed to come 
from their enemies), states do not inevitably make 
worst-case calculations in their style of behavior, 
or let this guide their policies for responding.”120 
Similarly, Li Bin and Zhao Tong report that: 
117   Shou, Zhanlue Xue, 192.
118   “Junshi Kexue Yuan zhuanjia jiemi wangluo kongjian weishe.”
119   Liu Yangyue, “Wangluo kongjian guoji Chongtu yu zhanlue wendingxing [International crises in cyberspace and strategic stability],” Waijiao 
pinglun [Foreign affairs review] 4 (2016): 112–15, http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-WJXY201604005.htm. 
120   Liu, “Wangluo kongjian guoji Chongtu yu zhanlue wendingxing, 118. Liu uses the same large-N and qualitative data as Western cyber securi-
ty scholarship to draw his conclusions.
121   Zhao and Li, “The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective,” 62–63.
122   Liu, “Wangluo kongjian guoji chongtu yu zhanlue wendingxing,” 125.
123   See for example, Lu, “Forging Stability in Cyberspace.”
124   Levite and Lyu, “Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace.”
Some Chinese experts have challenged the 
popular view that cyber technology will 
negatively affect crisis stability, because 
they believe this conclusion is based com-
pletely on logical deduction, instead of em-
pirical evidence. These experts have noted 
that states are usually very cautious about 
launching military retaliations to cyber at-
tacks, and it is very rare for cyber attacks to 
lead to escalation.121 
Nevertheless, Liu does express concern about the 
escalation risks posed by the difficulty of attribu-
tion. Citing the example of the Solar Sunrise intru-
sion discovered prior to U.S. airstrikes against Iraq 
in 1998, he argues that if third-party espionage or 
OPE “is coincidentally discovered during a military 
mission, or the attacker uses more sophisticated 
means to conceal their identity, then this kind of at-
tack could become a fuse for an unintended crisis.”122 
Other Chinese scholars are less sanguine about 
the escalation risks in cyberspace. They are more 
concerned about the use-or-lose incentives to car-
ry out cyber attacks early than inadvertent esca-
lation due to the discovery of an intrusion.123 The 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Ari-
el Levite and former PLA Col. Lyu Jinghua wrote 
in China Military Science that in a Sino-American 
conflict scenario, “one of the earliest and most 
destabilizing venues for conflict would be cyber-
space, thanks to the potential military utility of 
early employment of cyber assets.” Levite and Lyu 
acknowledge that “cyber actions in these scenarios 
also hold serious escalatory potential, complicating 
the challenges of keeping conflicts below the lev-
el of outright military confrontation.” They do not 
examine the contribution of OPE to that escalatory 
potential in detail, although they warn that “intelli-
gence operations to monitor these networks might 
be misinterpreted as attacks on them, or at least 
attack preparations.”124 
It is unclear whether PLA planning for offensive 
cyber operations accounts for the escalation risks 
associated with OPE. Nor is it clear how those risks 
are managed. Up until at least 2015, it appeared 
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likely that official PLA doctrine for offensive cyber 
operations was covered by doctrine for informa-
tion operations, which combined electronic, cyber, 
and kinetic attacks.125 The current structure for PLA 
cyber operational doctrine is unclear, but it might 
include operational doctrine for stand-alone cyber 
operations as well as joint information operations 
involving cyber attacks. Outgoing Communist Par-
ty Chairman Hu Jintao instructed the PLA to inno-
vate and pay particular attention to cyberspace in 
2012, after which some PLA research texts suggest-
ed that China might need stand-alone operational 
doctrine for cyber operations in the future.126 Nev-
ertheless, joint information warfare formations dis-
played in a 2017 PLA military parade suggest that 
the PLA is unlikely to replace operational doctrine 
for joint information operations with stand-alone 
cyber operations doctrine.127 The PLA might not 
have been able to implement the joint information 
operations campaign outlined in its early doctrine 
until it established a peacetime joint command 
structure during major military reforms in 2015.128
The PLA is likely to be updating its doctrine for 
cyber operations to account for recent changes in 
organizational structure. During the PLA’s 2015–16 
military reforms, it established the Strategic Sup-
port Force, which consolidated existing PLA cyber 
offense, defense, and espionage units from sepa-
rate parts of its former General Staff Department 
and services into a Network Systems Department 
within the Strategic Support Force. Before the re-
forms, the PLA General Staff Department’s Third 
Department was believed to be the primary or-
ganization for cyber espionage within the PLA, 
while the Fourth Department was believed to have 
125   Xue Xinglin, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan [Campaign Theory Study Guide] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2001), 53; Ye, Xinxi zuozhan xue 
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gress of the Chinese Communist Party],” Renmin Wang, Nov. 8, 2012, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151-9.html.
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129   Mark A. Stokes, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Computer Network Operations Infrastructure,” in China and Cybersecurity: 
Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 163–87.
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tives_13.pdf; Kania and Costello, “Seizing the Commanding Heights,” 27–29.
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primary responsibility for offensive cyber opera-
tions.129 The consolidation of the former Third and 
Fourth departments into one organization is likely 
to enable the PLA to better integrate cyber opera-
tions for espionage and attack.130 
The PLA organizational reforms would provide 
an appropriate organizational structure to help 
manage inadvertent escalation risks resulting from 
PLA cyber operations if China prioritizes doing so. 
The new organizational arrangements for military 
cyber operations improve the ability of top military 
leaders to recognize and manage the crisis escala-
tion risks associated with OPE. One of the key ef-
fects, if not drivers, of the consolidation of Chinese 
military cyber forces into the Strategic Support 
Force is to enable top military leaders to exercise 
stricter oversight over PLA cyber operations to pre-
vent accidental and unauthorized cyber attacks.131 
Indeed, PLA writings published around the time 
the Strategic Support Force was created emphasize 
the principle of “unified command” (tongyi zhihui) 
of cyber offense, defense, espionage, and control, 
as well as of PLA and non-PLA cyber capabilities.132 
Whether Chinese leadership oversight of cyber 
operations is or will someday be as strict as (or 
even stricter than) the Obama White House’s con-
trol over U.S. Cyber Command is difficult to de-
termine. But it is unlikely that interested parties 
outside of the PLA, such as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, would have veto power over cyber oper-
ations through an interagency process similar to 
what was laid out in PPD-20. Though it remains un-
clear, it is unlikely that China has a formal institu-
tional structure for interagency vetting of military 
plans and operations that crosses civilian and mil-
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itary lines.133 Overall, the available evidence from 
PLA organizational and operational procedures for 
cyber operations suggests little concern about the 
risks of inadvertent cyber escalation. 
Capabilities for Managing Cyber Risk
While China has indicated that it seeks to de-
velop cyber situational awareness capabilities, in-
cluding attribution capabilities, it likely lags behind 
the United States in its development of capabilities 
that could disambiguate between attackers and 
mitigate inadvertent escalation risks. An official 
white paper outlining China’s international cyber-
space strategy published in 2017 indicated that: 
[China] will expedite the development of a 
[military] cyber force and enhance capabil-
ities in terms of situational awareness, cy-
ber defense, supporting state activities and 
participating in international cooperation, to 
prevent major cyber crisis, safeguard cyber-
space security, and maintain national securi-
ty and social stability.134 
The Chinese government’s procedures for defend-
ing its networks are unclear. China has not yet pub-
licly and officially attributed cyber attacks to anoth-
er state. Nevertheless, some Chinese cyber security 
firms have begun to publicly attribute intrusions 
to known groups of hackers using industry identi-
fiers.135 They have also called for greater efforts to 
prevent OPE within critical infrastructure networks. 
Drawing lessons from Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s 
power grid, the Chinese company Antiy argued that 
China needed to “reduce the possibility of our in-
dustrial systems and infrastructure experiencing 
serious consequences in a conflict of similar inten-
sity.” It recommended that China “make progress in 
weakening the ability of an adversary to ‘prepare the 
battlefield’ in our industrial control [systems] and 
infrastructure to achieve [serious] consequences” 
in a similar scenario.136
133   China’s National Security Commission is focused on domestic security and does not appear to function in the same way as the U.S. National 
Security Council. The Chinese Communist Party’s Cybersecurity and Informatization Commission would be the most likely organization to conduct 
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Misperception in the Sino-American 
Cyber Relationship
The interaction of Chinese and U.S. approaches 
to cyber operations also affects the potential for in-
advertent escalation in ways that neither state can 
manage on its own. At least three mitigating factors 
could reduce the risk of inadvertent cyber escala-
tion via the misperception pathway in a future Si-
no-American crisis: a shared understanding of cyber 
conflict, dialogue to ensure that both parties under-
stand each other’s approach to cyber operations, 
and a crisis communications mechanism specific 
to cyber operations. These factors reduce the likeli-
hood of either side misperceiving the other’s cyber 
intrusion as OPE, or as confirmation of the other’s 
hostile intentions, because of differences in their 
understandings of cyber conflict and operations.137 
Understandings of Cyber Conflict
Comparing U.S. and Chinese approaches to cy-
ber conflict reveals some similarities, as well as dif-
ferences that could hamper future bilateral efforts 
to manage cyber escalation risks. Both countries 
recognize that OPE is necessary for sophisticated 
offensive cyber operations yet is indistinguishable 
from intrusions for the purpose of espionage, de-
fense, or data theft. Both countries view the pres-
ence of nation-state hackers in their networks as 
threatening. But the two countries do not appear to 
share an understanding of the inadvertent escala-
tion risks posed by the OPE-espionage distinction 
problem or the clarity of the threshold of an armed 
attack in cyberspace. 
The comparison also reveals asymmetries in the 
relative maturity of cyber doctrine and capabili-
ties in both countries. These asymmetries might 
explain the lack of attention to inadvertent esca-
lation risks in China’s approach to cyber conflict. 
The sources reviewed for this paper suggest that 
the PLA may have not yet adopted doctrine for 
its cyber units that includes much guidance on 
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OPE and managing its escalation risks.138 Future 
Chinese cyber doctrine will likely need to specify 
how espionage and attack capabilities will be in-
tegrated within both the Strategic Support Force 
and joint command structure. It will also need to 
specify the procedure for approving espionage and 
preparation for offensive operations within this 
new organizational structure. Meanwhile, U.S. cy-
ber capabilities and strategy are relatively more 
mature. U.S. organizations demonstrate growing 
confidence in attribution capabilities, the clarity of 
escalation thresholds, and the U.S. ability to con-
trol escalation from OPE or low-level cyber attacks. 
These factors have led to a doctrine for cyber oper-
ations that gives the military a freer hand. 
Neither China nor the United States appears to 
be overly concerned about its espionage activities 
being misperceived as OPE during a crisis, albeit 
for different reasons. On the one hand, China ap-
pears to be insufficiently aware or inattentive to 
the specific escalation risks posed by OPE. On the 
other hand, the United States appears to be aware 
of the specific escalation risks associated with OPE 
but is confident that they can be mitigated. This 
suggests that both states might approach a crisis 
confident that their intrusions will not be discov-
ered, misperceived, or lead to the use of force. The 
PLA’s recognition of the escalation risks associated 
with OPE might increase as Chinese cyber capa-
bilities mature, but increased awareness is by no 
means a given. Chinese experts and writings on 
crisis management and nuclear strategy — areas 
where PLA doctrine and capabilities are more ma-
ture — have also tended to overlook drivers of in-
advertent escalation.139 
Of course, the lack of concern about the esca-
lation risks associated with OPE could reflect a 
general lack of concern that cyber attacks could 
138   Costello and McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force”; Costello and Kania, “The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese 
Information Operations.”
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141   For discussion of this U.S. overture, see, Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 166–7.
cause much harm in a crisis, supporting the blus-
ter de-escalation hypothesis. OPE may simply be 
accepted practice between these two countries.140 
They might expect that some of their key networks 
will be disabled by their adversaries’ offensive cy-
ber operations during future conflicts. They might 
prepare to fight without those networks instead of 
preempting cyber attacks that could disable them. 
We are cautious, however, about interpreting the 
evidence as confirmation of the bluster hypothesis. 
There is little evidence to suggest that China both 
acknowledges and shares U.S. confidence that in-
advertent cyber escalation risks can be managed. 
More evidence that China takes this relaxed ap-
proach to cyber escalation risks may emerge as its 
doctrine and capabilities further mature, or more 
sources become available. 
Military Cyber Dialogue
China and the United States do not currently have 
an official military cyber dialogue that could bridge 
some of the gaps in their understandings of military 
cyber operations before a crisis emerges. There were 
promising signs of an official Sino-American cyber 
dialogue that could have covered military affairs in 
2013. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
even gave a one-way briefing on U.S. cyber military 
strategy to Chinese officials in 2014.141 But those ef-
forts were derailed by the Department of Justice’s 
indictments of PLA officers for industrial espionage 
in 2014. In 2015, the United States and China com-
menced a dialogue between the U.S. Department of 
Justice and Department of Homeland Security and 
China’s Ministry of Public Security on cyber crime 
and law enforcement. A series of track two expert 
cyber dialogues between the two countries also 
meet regularly. But, to the best of our knowledge at 
the time of writing, an official cyber dialogue cover-
ing military operations has yet to meet. 
China might be reluctant to engage in dialogue on 
cyber military issues for a number of reasons. The 
sources examined above suggest a Chinese per-
ception that the risk of cyber espionage or attacks 
escalating further is low. PLA perceptions of its 
own lack of maturity in cyber doctrinal and capa-
bilities development might be another factor. Chi-
na is also likely to perceive incentives to maintain 
secrecy about its cyber operations for military op-
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erational advantage. Nevertheless, Chinese schol-
ars acknowledge the value of track two dialogues 
underway. They have also endorsed proposals for 
both countries to refrain from intrusions into nu-
clear command-and-control systems that could be 
misperceived as OPE if discovered.142
Crisis Communications
China and the United States do not currently have 
a mechanism in place for crisis communications 
dedicated to cyber matters. By contrast, the United 
States has a three-tier cyber communications pro-
tocol in place with Russia that involves a direct line 
between the White House and the Kremlin, as well 
as a mechanism for non-crisis information exchange 
on national security matters between the two coun-
tries’ Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and a mecha-
nism for technical exchange between the two coun-
tries’ Computer Emergency Response Teams.143 By 
contrast, the United States has a hotline only with 
China’s Ministry of Public Security, which is intend-
ed to resolve cyber crime and law enforcement is-
sues. Of course, in a crisis situation leaders from 
both countries would have access to a general de-
fense hotline established in 2008.144 But the absence 
of a direct cyber crisis communications link is like-
ly to slow down efforts to seek information about 
an intrusion of concern in a crisis. Right now, those 
conversations are more likely to occur between gen-
eral national security officials rather than experts on 
cyber operations, which could create the conditions 
for inadvertent escalation in a crisis via the organi-
zational mechanism outlined above.
Conclusion: 
Implications and Recommendations
Could military cyber capabilities contribute to 
the outbreak of conflict in a future crisis involving 
the United States and China? Although our empiri-
cal analysis is unable to provide a definitive answer 
to this question, it provides enough evidence to 
suggest that inadvertent escalation could occur if 
one state discovered the other’s cyber intrusions in 
a crisis. The background and individual character-
istics of leaders dealing with this scenario are likely 
to have an important influence on how these risks 
142   Levite and Lyu, “Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace”; Lu, “Forging Stability in Cyberspace,” 130.
143   Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Information and Communications Technology Security,” The White 
House Archive, June 17, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-us-russian-cooperation-informa-
tion-and-communications-technol.
144   Lindsay Beck, “China and U.S. Sign Accord on Defense Hotline,” Reuters, Feb. 29, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-us-de-
fence-idUSPEK7130320080229.
play out. Even a small risk of inadvertent escalation 
should not be dismissed by policymakers, given 
how destructive a Sino-American conflict could be 
and the variety of other escalation risks present in 
the relationship. For scholars, our empirical find-
ings cannot resolve the debate about the influence 
of cyber technology on crisis escalation. But they 
do point to important areas for further research to 
better understand the peacetime preparations that 
states make for cyber conflict.
Our analysis suggests that there is a real risk of 
inadvertent escalation in a future Sino-American 
crisis if either country discovers an intrusion in a 
crisis and decides to use force in response. Over 
the past decade or so, the United States has made 
unilateral attempts to limit the risks of inadvertent 
escalation occurring, first with strict organizational 
procedures governing all cyber operations and later 
with more robust defense and attribution capabili-
ties (though the effectiveness of this more aggres-
sive approach is unclear). There is little evidence 
that China has taken similar steps to unilaterally 
mitigate inadvertent escalation risks from cyber 
operations. The bilateral cyber relationship also 
lacks the shared understandings and mechanisms 
for dialogue in peacetime or communications in 
crises that would mitigate the risk of inadvertent 
escalation. The interaction of the two countries’ 
different approaches to cyber conflict increases 
the likelihood of their leaders misperceiving each 
other’s actions in a future crisis.
Nevertheless, our findings are tentative and by 
no means prove that the presence of cyber military 
capabilities is likely to lead decision-makers to use 
force in a crisis. They could also support the claims 
of scholars who argue that cyber capabilities do not 
pose a serious enough threat for decision-makers 
to use force, whether cyber or kinetic, to preempt 
or retaliate. A Sino-American crisis scenario is the 
most likely case for claims that offensive cyber ca-
pabilities pose risks of inadvertent escalation. The 
evidence we have uncovered does not clearly sup-
port this claim. But nor does the evidence support 
the claim that inadvertent escalation risks from cy-
ber capabilities are a myth. 
Our analysis also raises questions about the as-
sumptions on which U.S. cyber policy is based. Is 
the United States correct in ascribing its adver-
saries’ reluctance to escalate in cyberspace to the 
The Scholar
80
nature of cyber operations?145 Or does this reluc-
tance reflect adversaries’ countervailing strategic 
and political disincentives to escalate? As James 
Miller and Neal Pollard have argued: “The risk of 
escalation within and beyond cyberspace cannot 
be waved away by assuming that a cyberspace-on-
ly agreed competition exists or will soon exist.”146 
If a Sino-American crisis had occurred during the 
past decade, Beijing would have faced strong coun-
tervailing pressures not to use force in response to 
a cyber intrusion, even if it judged that intrusion 
to pose a serious threat, because it faced a situa-
tion of decisive conventional military inferiority in 
a conflict with Washington. That may not be the 
case in the future.
These questions are crucial in evaluating the U.S. 
record in cyber operations and the inferences that 
can be drawn from that record about cyber con-
flict more broadly. Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. 
Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness find that the United 
States has been successful in using cyberspace to 
coerce adversaries.147 Scholars have pointed out 
that cyber operations are likely to have their great-
est effects on international relations when com-
bined with superior conventional military power, 
suggesting that the United States has key advan-
tages in deploying cyber operations without caus-
ing escalation.148 Our analysis suggests that further 
research is needed on this point. 
Several steps may be taken to mitigate the 
risks of misperception of cyber activities. These 
steps could help to pave the way for an official Si-
no-American cyber dialogue or a dedicated mech-
anism for bilateral crisis communications regard-
ing cyber matters. First, scholars should aim to 
increase awareness of the specific escalation risks 
associated with OPE within the PLA. Raising aware-
ness of these risks would be especially timely if we 
are correct in speculating that the PLA is current-
ly formulating cyber doctrine for its first military 
cyber organizational structure that integrates of-
fense and espionage. To overcome sensitivity and 
secrecy surrounding China’s own cyber operations, 
scholarly efforts could focus on the OPE-espionage 
distinction problem as it concerns third parties, 
given Chinese scholars’ concerns about the esca-
latory potential of misattributing third-party cyber 
145   Richard J. Harknett and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Through Persistent Engagement, the U.S. Can Influence ‘Agreed Competition,’” Lawfare, 
April 15, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/through-persistent-engagement-us-can-influence-agreed-competition.
146   James N. Miller and Neal A. Pollard, “Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition and Deterrence in Cyberspace,” Lawfare, April 30, 2019, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/persistent-engagement-agreed-competition-and-deterrence-cyberspace.
147   Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion.
148   See for example, Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar.”
149   “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government,” The White House, Nov. 15, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF.
attacks in a crisis scenario. 
Second, the Defense Department and U.S. Cyber 
Command could explain the principles they use to 
manage the escalation risks of OPE in their cur-
rent, more aggressive strategy. This could mirror 
efforts in 2016, when the United States released 
details regarding its principles and procedures for 
either publicly disclosing or restricting information 
on the discovery of software vulnerabilities.149 The 
command’s senior leaders have done an admirable 
job of sharing more of their strategy and vision for 
U.S. cyber operations, and their work thus far pro-
vides a foundation for leading by example on esca-
lation risk management. Explaining the command’s 
principles for escalation management could allow 
the United States to allay the risks of mispercep-
tions raised by its own operations, provide other 
countries with a model for managing escalation 
risks, and set norms of appropriate conduct in 
cyberspace. Looking ahead, the interaction of cri-
sis dynamics and the novel features of offensive 
cyber operations such as OPE will require con-
stant reevaluation by policymakers and scholars 
alike to ensure that the emerging Sino-American 
great-power competition does not result in a pre-
ventable conflict. 
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